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The author begins with a selective outline of historical understandings of the concepts of
space and time, in order to demonstrate their import for and engagement with theology. She
then procedes to organize the three key concepts in Torrance's thought that are the most signifi-
cant to the advancement of contemporary theology using insights from "new science. "
Theologian Thomas Torrance has
shown that the concepts of space and time
have been key epistemological instruments
of historical theological and scientific
paradigms, creating either intellectual-
spiritual synthesis or dissonance. Torrance
cogently demonstrates that the epistemology
of 'new science' has allowed for dramatic
advances in its development of 'cognitive
instruments' that can discern objective
knowledge in a way that is compatible with,
and especially constructive for, the task of
new theology.
Understandings of space and time:
relational finite receptacle, infinite
receptacle
Within Greek science and philosophy,
space was understood as a 'finite receptacle'
or container that delimited matter, thereby
making the material world finite and
comprehensible. Patristic thinkers argued,
instead, that since God created out of
nothing, space and time are rational
structures, created with and embedded in
nature. They further argued that all of
creation—rational and material— is made
comprehensible through the divine creative
power, not through God's physical embodi-
ment of the universe. Furthermore, since
space and time are the bearers of the'
universe's immanent order, they are the
rational media through which God is made
known to us in the incarnation. Thus, a
concept of space emerged as the seat of
relations-ontologiCal and dynamic—
between God and the universe, established
in creation and brought into its sharpest
focus in the incarnation. 1 Thus, it was very
much a differential concept, relating
creaturely and transcendent rationality.
With the recovery of Aristotelian
philosophy and science in the late Middle
Ages, there was a return to the finite
receptacle notion of space and time and a
correlative static notion of God as the
Unmoved Mover. However, with the
Reformation doctrine of 'grace alone' and
the contingency of the world, a new interest
was aroused in empirical investigation into
the rational world. Aligned with the
attempts of Renaissance science to set aside
a priori explanations and 'final causes,' the
notion of space developed as the 'infinite
receptacle' of all things. Newton, who
embraced this view, understood space and
time as attributes of God; that is, he held that
God quite literally contains and compre-
hends the universe in the divine self. 2
Furthermore, as the infinite receptacle of all
creaturely matter, God conferred rationality
upon nature by causally conditioning
material existence.
Newton's scheme carried with it
enormous theological and scientific implica-
tions. First, absolute space and time were
immovable, conceptualizations that brought
a return to static notions of God. Also, as
fixed frames, space and time were unaf-
fected by what happened in them. This
built-in dualism between space/time and
matter meant there was no way in which
The Boston Theological Institute 65
God (as absolute container) could become or her own appropriation (Christ-for-us) and
incarnate (as content). Indeed, Newton not one ontologically given.6
found himself in sharp conflict with It is in this conflation of Newtonian,
Athanasius' notion of homoousion and Lutheran and Kantian ideas that Torrance
defended Arianism, instead. 3 At the same finds the root of the modern Protestant
time, the notion that fixed space and time antithesis between God and the world,
causally condition material existence (the phenomenal and eternal events, Geschichte
inertial system) led naturally to a mechanis- and Historie- that is so problematic for
tic view of the universe. 4 contemporary Christians. Such a conflation
. Torrance finds this dualism and staticity, was possible because of the shared 'recep-
together with the Lutheran view offinitum tacle' notion of space and time, with their
capax infiniti, to be the intellectual roots of epistemological corollaries. Atheism,
deism, natural theolo-
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universe from God to the human mind (') The instrument must coordinate rational
,. , TT . __ . form or theoretic components and being or
( transcendental ego ). Here, in effect, the material existence. This eliminates dualism
human mind becomes the (Newtonian) .or disintegration of imbued structures. (In
infinite receptacle that makes knowledge theology, this coordination is necessary
... because material existence is imbued with
possible.
rationality in God's act of creative-compre-
The first implication is that God, who is hension.)
outside this world, is strictly unknowable, ,.,. ™ . t . . . .,J (11) I he instrument must be upwardly
not being an object that can be shaped by adaptable, such that it uses one level of
human reason. If God is to be known, it rationality and material existence while
must be through some other means. Thus, pointing beyond itself to another level, yet° without becoming detached rrom the lower
there arose a radical dualism between Kant's
ieve i. This eliminates reductionism. (In
notion of faith's knowledge and reason. The theology, this is necessary because creation
second implication is that, if space and time and th5 irfarnation provide the ontological
...
r
. ground or our existence while pointing
are a priori forms of human perception, then beyond themselves, revealing the truth of
the only God a person can have is one of his God.)
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(Ill) The unity of rational form and being in
nature means that our investigation is fused
with both components from the start. Thus,
true knowledge cannot be:
—known in advance: a priori conceptualism
of imposing form upon content,
—directly experienced: pure empiricism,
—artificially abstracted: theoretic rationality
separate from materiality.
Rather, ontological knowledge is an "experi-
enced imperceptible." 10 Thus, there is no
methodTor its discovery; only by intuitively
penetrating reality can true knowledge of
nature and God can be disclosed.
Before discussing new science and new
theology in light of this instrument, it will be
useful to review the methodological shift
from Newton to Kant to. new science.
Newtonian Methodology
As stated above, it was during the
Reformation and Renaissance that an
attempt at an a posteriori science emerged.
However, as Torrance interprets the matter,
Newton's methodology did not fully
conform to this agenda. The first scientific
contradiction arose with Newton's claim that
he was deriving his scientific concepts
empirically . "Whatever is not deduced
from phenomena is to be called an hypoth-
esis," said Newton; "and hypotheses... have
no place in experimental philosophy." 11 But,
in fact, he contradicted this precept by
identifying space and time with the absolute
-which, by definition, was completely
inaccessible to empirical observation
Newton did bring theoretical components
into his analysis. The second problem was
that these theoretical components were an
artificial abstraction of form, separated from
interaction with material content, and thus
not ontological. Because of Newton's
profound success in defining motion,
Torrance notes that the scientific world was
misled into believing that the scientific
process is that of deducing rational laws
from sense experience. 12
According to Torrance then, for two
related reasons Newton's approach does not
satisfy the challenge of new science and new
theology to develop appropriate cognitive
instruments. First, form or rational struc-
tures must be coordinated with material
content (see (I) above), whereas Newton
separated them by identifying space and
time as entities independent of the material
world. Second, while Newton was right in
attempting to discover form (though he
actually imposed it), he erroneously con-
ceived of this as direct empiricism. But as
new science shows, rational space and time
are fused with matter and energy; rational
forms alone are not directly accessible! 13
Following Einstein, Torrance maintains that
"while concepts are suggested by experi-
ence, they require creative and constructive
activity on the part of the human mind for
their discovery." They are "experienced
imperceptibles" (see (III) above). 14
Kantian Methodology
With Hume's critique of causality,
empirical science had no means of justifica-
tion. Kant did not challenge Newton's
theoretical scheme, but instead found a
justifiable explanation for it with his
synthetic a priori. But, of course, this meant
that the intellect does not draw its laws out
of nature, but instead imposes its laws upon
nature. 15 Correlatively, nature in itself
cannot be known. While Torrance affirms
Kant's attempt to coordinate the theoretical
and the empirical, his notion of a priori
human conceptuality was erroneous in that it
meant empirical knowledge was essentially
controlled and not apprehended. It is here
that Torrance believes science and theology
accepted the notion that form is not some-
thing to be discovered (contra (III) above);
rather "we clothe the universe with form and
structure and thereby give it meaning for
ourselves." 16 From this came the rational-
istic functionalism (instrumentalism) of the
modern mind.
New Science Approach
Torrance argues that new science has
begun to develop this cognitive instrument
that overcomes the problems of the
Newtonian and Kantian models. Below is a
summary of his view of what has been
discovered using the three essential charac-
teristics of the instrument as outlined above.
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(A) Coordination of form and being (rational
structures and material existence).
New science shows a world in which
relations between bodies are just as real as
the bodies themselves. 17 For instance,
special relativity shows that space and time
are not independent, but represent just two
different cross-sections of one'space-time'.
continuum. General relativity theory shows
that space itself is affected by matter, that
space affects the movement of matter, and
that time is shrunk by gravity. The splitting
of this four-dimensional continuum into
three dimensional space and one-dimen-
sional time is purely arbitrary and instru-
mental. Attempts to separate form and
materiality necessarily involves artificial
construction of an abstraction, such as
Newton's geometry of the relations between
rigid bodies, independent of time—relations
derived logically and not ontologically.
Such dualisms have been found to be
incongruent with reality and, thus, must be
set aside. 18
(B) A flexible instrument that coordinates
different levels of existence without
confusing them or nullifying lower levels.
An example of this is new science's
development of unitary field theory, which
attempts to give full weight both to knowl-
edge of countable quantized packets of
energy and momentum (particle-like
behavior), and to knowledge of field
properties of extension in space (wave-like
behavior). The newly developed tool of
unitary theory enlarges the imagination to
perceive a new level of complexity not
foreseen in the individual parts. This
coordination must put to rest any forms of
reductionism, as new science has come to
recognize that component parts have no
separate identity and can only be understood
within their holistic configuration. 20
(C) An instrument that penetrates into the
"experienced imperceptibility" and, through
testing, establishes a true ontology.
Now that new science has accepted the
unity of form and material existence and put
to rest a mechanistic understanding of
nature, it no longer attempts naive empiri-
cism, false abstraction and a priori concep-
tualism. Concurring with Einstein, Torrance
maintains that there is no logical path to the
laws of nature, but "only intuition, resting
on sympathetic understanding of experience,
can reach them." 21 The true ontology of
these 'free concepts' will be established or
negated when tested against intelligible
nature.
An example is found in relativity
theory. This cognitive instrument shows an
invariant structure of relatedness in nature,
irrespective of any observer. 22 Thus, says
Torrance, "the very fact that we can offer
various representations, without making any
difference to what we apprehend, reveals
that it is so objectively deep that it remains
invariant to our representations of it."23
Torrance states, "This 'invention' comes to
us from the universe itself and with its
astonishing correlation between our human
thinking and empirical reality, we cannot
think that they might just as well have
happened otherwise, for it is thrust upon us
as belonging to an intelligible order indepen-
dent of us."24 It should be noted that
Torrance does not regard this cognitive
instrument as final, but rather as "an open
and flexible structure used postulationally"
as reality is probed. 25
New Theology
When theology seeks to interpret the
incarnation and creation with respect to the
questions of space and time, it too needs to
develop an appropriate cognitive instrument
in accordance with the characteristics
outlined above. Below is a summary of-
Torrance's insights about this instrument for
new theology.
(1) Coordination of form and being..
Without the dualism of materiality and
rational space-time, or between nature and
supernature, there can no longer be a
dualism between natural theology and
revealed theology. Whatever is revealed
about God is done within the created
rationalities of space-time and, thus, can
only be discerned within them. Revealed
theology can no longer be pursued apart
from the structures of space and time, lest it
lapse into irrationality. 26 In order to develop
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an adequate account of creation and incarna- in itself (since the contingent world cannot
tion, theology must consider the empirical explain itself), but only as attaining meaning
dimensions in space-time. Analogously, and cogency when properly coordinated
natural theology must be transformed. with the empirical conditions of revealed
Historically, natural theology used a method theology. 29
of abstract reasoning based upon sense Thus, to avoid reductionism, ontologi-
experience and then attempted to relate that cal knowledge requires asking questions 'in
opposite directions' at the
r same time—in accordance
Without the dualism of materiality and with the nature and acts of
rational space-time, or between nature \ God and in accordance with
. .
,
.
•
. the nature and acts of ere-
and supernature, there can no longer be
ation ne possible way of
a dualism between natural theology and expressing this, Torrance
revealed theology. Whatever is revealed suggests, is to use the model
°*/
or horizontal and vertical
about God is done Within the Created coordinate systems. Accord
rationalities ofspace-time and, thus, can m^ Jesus Christ is then the
, , ,. i • i • » place in all of space and time
only be discerned within them. where God meets with
humanity and humanity meets
reasoning to God. But new natural theology with God, thus constituting ah intersection
can no longer be extrinsic to actual knowl- of vertical and horizontal planes. ?a This is
edge of God; rather, Torrance calls for where human .beings are opened to the
natural theology as a 'theological geometry' transcendent ground of God that gives
that can articulate the material logic of humanity its true place, for it relates its
knowledge of God as mediated within place to its ontological ground, so that it is
space-time. 27 This overall coordination of not submerged in relativities of what is
materiality and rationality is analogous to merely horizontal. Since this coordination
the task of new science when it disavowed of vertical and horizontal axes relates two
Euclidean geometry as an a priori system different realities, they are not to be thought
independent of materiality, and introduced of as one and the same language. The
four-dimensional physical-geometry. resultant confusion inevitably leads to
(2) Coordinating creaturely and Divine breaking them apart entirely; and then,
rationalities without confusing them or erroneously, they become merely symbolic.
nullifying creaturely rationality. Development of these differential languages
Because of God's transcendent freedom, lies ahead in theology,
created rationality cannot be identified with
(3) Penetrating into the "experienced
Divine rationality (contra Newton). How- imperceptibility" and, through testing,
ever, since created rationality is derived establishing true ontology,
from the Divine rationality, we must not Since an a posteriori approach in
think of the incarnation as abrogating the science and theology is sought, there are no
rational structures of this world; rather, the rules or 'methods' for discovering ontologi-
incarnation is to be understood as the freely cal knowledge. What is required is penetrat-
chosen path of God's rationality. 28 Precisely ing into and following what is given,
because there is an axis of intersection The truth of findings are determined by
between God and the world in creation and correlation. When rationality and being are
the incarnation, they can and must be disjoined, and abstractions are made,
properly coordinated. Such a non-reduction- theorists then test for inner consistency and
istic coordination means that natural coherence in order to ascertain their logical
theology cannot be thought of as complete truth or falsity. This is an instrumentalist
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and positivist approach to science and its
verification, which does not seek to grasp
reality in its depth (ontologically). 31 In
contrast, Torrance argues, when theorists
operate with the unity of rationality and
being and penetrate into reality so as to
grasp its invariant structures, then reality
itself is the ultimate judge of what is true or
false, since the concern is for ontic and not
logical necessity. 32 For theology, the
decisive act of God in the incarnation is that
invariant locus for our knowledge of God,
which can be discerned only by following
God in that spatio-temporal disclosure. 33
Conclusions
Thomas Torrance's instruments of space
and time are profoundly valuable for
bringing to the surface the deep inter-
relationship between theology, science and
epistemology. In the summarization of these
relationships for this paper, simplification
may shade into falsification of major lines of
thought. Torrance's corpus greatly expands
upon this intellectual history, but he too may
simplify in his attempt to illumine the
modern and post-modern struggles with
notions of realism and ontology.
Certainly many theologians today have
come to recognize the need to move past
dualism and reductionism. And yet, few
have grasped the deeper workings of a
cognitive instrument that can overcome
them in the way that Torrance sets forth, nor
do they recognize the ontology implicit in
doing so. However, Torrance's deepest
insight about an instrument that attempts to
set aside empiricism, a priori conceptual-
ism, and abstract rationality, in favor of an
intuitive penetration of the deeper ontology
of nature and of God, seems a far more
Utopian vision. Few are gifted with the
requisite combination of genius, creativity
and faith for such fluid, free and open
movement of thought. Most will continue to
impose preconceived ideas about God and
nature onto theology, as well as to attempt to
find logical bridges rather than ontological
explanations for reality. It is likely that a
multiplicity of theologies will continue to be
formulated and evangelized. If Torrance
himself has not fully conceived of the
cognitive instrument for theology, he can be
fully credited with insightfully identifying
what it ought to be seeking after; and,
therefore, he may have a place among those
great theologians he notes as exemplars of
his vision—Athanasius of Alexandria,
Anselm of Canterbury, and Soren
Kierkegaard.
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